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that we can’t see objects by seeing their shadows, it would be much
harder to understand how it is that – as was mentioned earlier –
top-lit objects are typically so much easier for us to see and recognize
than bottom-lit ones. Their shadows are much more important than
their outlines or colours in this regard. In fact, it is perfectly possible
to depict a visually recognizable object by depicting only its shadows
– for example, in a charcoal sketch of a human face, or in a grey-tone
painting of a white cloth with many folds and creases in it.
Curiously enough, Sorensen denies that we can feel shadows – so
that talk of ‘feeling a cool shade’ cannot, according to him, be con-
strued as literally being true – on the grounds that temperature is pos-
sessed only by things containingmolecules inmotion, being ‘defined’
as their average kinetic energy (118). This, as far as I can tell, is one of
Sorensen’s few slips of a purely scientific nature, since modern
physics apparently allows that even the vacuum has a temperature.
Sorensen also denies that shadows can have any colour other than
black, contending that we need to distinguish shadows themselves
from the ‘light pollution’ that may sometimes penetrate and fill
them, rather as extraneous matter may sometimes penetrate and fill
a hole in a material object. Sorensen coins a snappy new word,
‘filtow’, for the kind of body of coloured light, produced by a filter,
that may, according to him, overlap or even coincide with a shadow.
Sorensen’s book is certainly fascinating and richly thought-
provoking. It discusses many intriguing topics that I have not even
been able to touch upon. Much of what he says may well induce
doubt and even incredulity, at least on a first reading. But he argues
carefully and clearly in favour of his key claims, all of which merit
very serious consideration, even if they sometimes provoke one to
construct and defend alternative views. That, however, is surely the
hallmark of the very best kind of philosophy writing. Seeing Dark
Things is a model of this kind.
E. J. Lowe
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Revolutionary Saints presents a reading of the work of Heidegger in
the 1920s and ‘30s. Rickey argues that Heidegger’s ‘predominant
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concern was finding and articulating an authentically religious stance
towards the world’ (7) and that that concern informs, among other
things, his involvement with the Nazi regime. There are a number
of important studies available that explore religious aspects of
Heidegger’s thought and a host that explore his politics, but
Rickey’s is one of the very few that do both.
It is now quite widely recognized that theological concerns shape
Heidegger’s thought in the years leading up to the publication of
Being and Time, years during which he immersed himself in the
work of Scotus, Aquinas, Luther, Augustine and Paul, among
others. But this view, which Rickey promotes and which is surely
correct, is often associated with two other views, both of which
Rickey attacks: (i) that while such theological concerns may have set
Heidegger upon his track and reasserted themselves to some degree
in his later reflections, their influence on his mature early work is
much less significant and (ii) that to recognize the religious inspi-
ration behind Heideggerian ‘authenticity’ is to recognize that ‘ideal’
as concerning a person’s ‘inner life’.
In the background here is the long-standing worry that Being
and Time is subject to the influence of two incompatible forces:
crudely put, an ‘individualising’ force – manifest in the discussion
of authenticity, where we are called upon to resist the influence of
‘the They’ – and a ‘counter-individualising’ force – manifest in the
discussion of Being-in-the-world and Being-with-others, where we
human beings are presented as essentially constituted by our involve-
ment with theworld around us andwith the community of others that
populate that world. Rickey responds to this tension by arguing that
Heidegger’s concern with individualisation is also a concern with (a)
community (Being-with-others) and (b) work (Being-in-the-world).
In connection with (a), Rickey makes a convincing case for think-
ing authentic existence must be understood as, in some sense, a com-
munal affair and, pace (ii), that that is consistent with this ideal having
a religious inspiration.He proposes that to ascribe toHeidegger a reli-
giosity of extreme individualism and asocial inner purity is ‘to ascribe
to him a conception of religion foreign to his endeavours’ (103–4):
the antinomian mysticism which Rickey sees in Heidegger is ‘com-
munal from the ground up’ (116) and, rather than leading to an apo-
litical withdrawal from the public sphere (as (ii) suggests), would
place politics at the heart of his thinking. In connection with (b),
Rickey argues that ‘[i]n Being and Time . . . there is a deep ambiguity
in the meaningfulness of work and the everyday world’ (73 n.3), an
ambiguity which Heidegger comes to address in his later concern
with technology. According to this novel reading, these later
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reflections attempt to understand authentic existence as a this-
worldly one in which concern with ‘our daily bread’ must figure. It
is by drawing partly on his discussion of (a) and (b) that Rickey
makes a case for thinking that Heidegger’s Nazism had a serious phi-
losophical motivation.
There is a lot going on in this book and a short review such as this
can only touch on some of this; much of what follows is critical but
this is a thought-provoking piece of work with a distinctive approach
and something to contribute on a number of important topics.
One issue on which I remain inclined to side with the orthodoxy is
(i). One can understand why one might be inclined to think a passage
such as the following articulates the ideas of a religious thinker:
In the moment of authenticity, being ecstatically reveals itself as
the meaning of the world. To be an authentic self means to be at
one with this revelation of being, to be at one with a meaning of
existence that is enacted as a specific historical epoch . . . To be an
authentic self is to be the site of a revolutionary revelation of
being that acts by founding worlds. (70).
But at the same time, much would seem to depend on how such
abstract remarks are filled out, on how we understand expressions
like ‘revelation’ and ‘being at one with’. Rickey talks of such ‘revel-
ations’ as ‘divine revelation’ (7) and as ‘flashes of divinity’ (6). But
why think of them in such terms? They may be unanticipatable
and ascribable to no source that can be identified with a particular
entity or event within the world; but their lacking any kind of
natural cause is not a reason to believe that they have a cause that
merits description in religious terms.
My root worry is that Rickeymay be operating with a notion of ‘the
religious’ that is so thin that one will be hard put to assess his argu-
ment. Early in the book, Rickey refers to a concept of ‘[r]eligion,
understood broadly’ ‘as the relationship between humans and the
divine’ (3); but what is ‘the divine’? Rickey emphasises that
‘Heidegger is interested neither in personal salvation nor in faith’
(166), nor ‘an eternal order’ (70), and one doesn’t need to be
hugely sophisticated to imagine a ‘religious thinker’ like that; but
when Rickey describes Heidegger’s Christianity as ‘peculiar in that
it retained the form and rejected the substance’ (82), one does start
to wonder what it would take for Rickey for Heidegger not to be a
‘religious thinker’.
(One might think that one can deal with this problem by reference
to examplars: so, for example, might Rickey’s most detailed descrip-
tion of parallels between Heidegger and a religious thinker, Meister
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Eckhart, demonstrate that Heidegger is fundamentally a religious
thinker? Unfortunately, this example is bedevilled by the fact that
it attempts to explain one body of work that is very difficult to
fathom by claiming that it is in essentially the same business as
another body of work that is also very difficult to fathom; what
such a claim tells one about the first body of work may be quite
limited because of the difficulty of fathoming the second and one
finds oneself wondering whether Rickey is revealing parallels on the
level of ideas or just on that of verbal formulation, turn of phrase.)
At one point, Rickey talks of Heidegger ‘adopting . . . Christian
motif[s] to his own project’ (98) but it seems to me that Rickey
needs to make stronger claims than that, because the presence of reli-
giousmotifs in Heidegger’s mature early work might well be accepted
by adherents of (i). A case in point would be his invocation of the idea
that ‘[g]enuine religion . . . can experience the whole’ (25). This plays
an important but, I think, questionable role in Rickey’s cases for
thinking that, for Heidegger, ‘to pursue phenomenology is already
to live religiously’ (28) and that religious notions inflect profoundly
Heidegger’s appropriation of Aristotle’s concept of phrone¯sis.
Rickey is surely right to point to an important religious motivation
in Heidegger’s notion of phenomenology as a return to ‘an authentic
primordial layer of life from which theory was cut off’ (22); a theolo-
gical overlooking of religious experience in focussing instead on doc-
trine surely is one of the most important examples for the young
Heidegger of how ‘the theoretical attitude’ distorts our understand-
ing of ourselves and of the world around us; and phenomenology’s
particular interest in ‘the whole’ (26) – on the grounds that ‘[t]his
whole forms the background, so to speak, within which each thing
appears in its specific meaning’ (29) – also surely parallels a recogniz-
ably religious interest in ‘the whole’. But equally philosophy has
always been concerned with ‘the whole’, with the world as a whole,
Being as such, thought, language, objecthood, etc. in general. One
might reply that that just betrays the fact that religious ideas (or
perhaps just motifs?) suffuse philosophy in general. But that won’t
do for Rickey because he wishes to claim that there is something dis-
tinctively religious about Heidegger’s philosophy in particular.
Rickey’s discussion of ‘Heidegger’s startling transformation of
phrone¯sis’ (225) provokes a similar worry. Rickey argues that, for
Heidegger, phrone¯sis is a ‘revelation of being as a whole’ (64), ‘the
instantaneous moment of vision that clears the opening in which
beings come to presence, the lightning flash of being which steers
the whole’ (18); Rickey proposes that we see a religious twist here
in this concern with ‘the whole’. But this seems odd since Aristotle
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himself characterises phrone¯sis precisely as guiding action in the light
of an understanding not of one ‘department’ of life but of the good
life as a whole (Nicomachean Ethics 6.5 1140a25–31). Once again,
a concern with life ‘as a whole’ does not demonstrate that
Heidegger’s thinking is distinctively religious.
I have other worries about the ‘transformed’ notion that Rickey
presents. Unlike Aristotle, who ‘believed that phrone¯sis accompanies
all action’, Heidegger, Rickey suggests, saw phrone¯sis as ‘a rare occur-
rence in human life’, ‘the birth of entirely new worlds, with new gods
and new ways of grasping the direction of history’ (59). Through
Aristotle’s phrone¯sis, we ‘go beyond’, in some sense, what rules have
to offer and, in doing so, make a certain kind of unguided leap;
being struck by that fact might possibly lead one to adopt something
like the notion that Rickey describes and in particular if one’s think-
ing is influenced by certain Pauline ideas. But what I think Rickey
fails to present is enough evidence for thinking that this is indeed
what happened to Heidegger and that the above ‘transformed’
notion of phrone¯sis plays a role in, for example, Being and Time: in
Rickey’s presentation of these supposedly distinctive inflections
(58–64), virtually all of the textual evidence comes from 1935’s An
Introduction to Metaphysics and Heidegger’s 1935–36 and 1942 lec-
tures on Ho¨lderlin, and it is far from clear that all of these passages
concern phrone¯sis. I don’t want to question ‘the equation between
phrone¯sis and authenticity’ (18 n. 7) or what is also obviously impor-
tant to Rickey, the notion that that equation makes authenticity a
matter of practical wisdom, an aspect of our acting rather than some
kind of mere ‘stance’; and Rickey’s ‘transformed’ phrone¯sis might
perhaps be seen as at work in the later Heidegger. But there seems
to be good reason to be sceptical about its figuring inBeing and Time.
As Rickey himself points out (14 n. 3), his picture of Heidegger’s
development in the decade running up to Being and Time is depen-
dent on interpretations of that same period offered by Kisiel and
van Buren, both of whom strike me as a little too ready to read later
themes into the earlier work. Moreover, neither of these interpreters
is the easiest to interpret and Rickey’s version exacerbates that diffi-
culty by being so very condensed, indeed almost telegraphic at
times. The material under discussion is in itself extremely difficult
and I found much of what Rickey had to say here under-explained.
Thus, a caveat that must be added to my earlier critical remarks is
that I found the sections which present the claims that I criticise
often very hard to follow.
I will end with a few brief comments on Rickey’s understanding of
Heidegger’s Nazi involvement, according to which ‘[h]is political
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activism flowed from his religious motives’ (103). Rickey argues that a
national, socialist, workers party would meet Heidegger’s need for
the enacting of a communal, historically- and culturally-specific rev-
elation of being that places work at the heart of authentic existence.
He also argues that Heidegger’s readiness to embrace the
Fu¨hrerprinzip reflects the fact that the kind of antinomian ‘commu-
nity of saints’ which he envisaged needs a charismatic leader if it is
to be unified, since it ‘reject[s] organisation and rule’ (223, 12, 7).
Setting aside the above worries about how religious such needs are,
Rickey’s case is an interesting and novel one in which there may be
some truth. But one ought not to overestimate the extent to which it
undermines the views of thosewhowould separateHeidegger’s philos-
ophy from his politics. Were Rickey’s account to be correct, onewould
still need to seeHeidegger’s political actions as those of a ‘philosophical
dreamer’ who ‘constructed an entire imaginary philosophical stage for
the historical happening’ of Nazism (R. Safranski, Martin Heidegger:
Between Good and Evil, trans. E. Osers (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1998), 234, 235); one needs such a ‘stage’ in order
to explain how Heidegger came to see Hitler as that necessary charis-
matic leader and that National Socialist Workers Party as the national,
socialist, workers party that would ‘overturn the existing experience of
being’ (193). The very vagueness of what Rickey sees Heidegger as
seeking might well account for his willingness to join in the Nazi’s
‘vague invocation of German national destiny’ (251). But that very
vagueness also somewhat weakens the case for thinking that there
was a powerful philosophical connection between Heidegger’s philos-
ophy and Nazi politics.
I should repeat that, despitemyworries, there ismuch of interest in
this book, much that I have been unable to discuss here. Rickey offers
a fresh and thought-provoking perspective on Heidegger’s politics
and religiosity.
Denis McManus
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In this substantial and carefully argued book, Daniel Haybron devel-
ops an account of happiness – what it is, how it relates to well-being,
and why all too many people fail to achieve it. These are pressing
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